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This is the first in a series of four articlescommemorating the
bicentennial of American legal education, dating from the establishment of the first chair of law and police, occupied by
George Wythe, at the College of William and Mary on December 4, 1779. The colonial antecedents to the College's formal
relation to professional legal education may be traced to the
career of Sir John Randolph, a student at William and Mary,
1705-1713, who then preparedfor the bar at Gray'sInn, London
(1715-1717). Randolph's two sons, Peyton ("The Patriot")and
John ("The Tory") followed his example, first at the College
of William and Mary and subsequently at the Middle Temple.
His grandson, Edmund, after study at the College on the eve
of the Revolution, read for the bar under his father and uncle.
The Randolphs and their cousins, Thomas Jefferson and John
Marshall,were prototypes of various leaders of legal and political thought in colonial and early post-Revolutionary Virginia
whose efforts "Americanized" English legal institutions and
thus created a logical need for a new school to teach this
"Americanized" law. This series of articles addresses some aspects of law and procedure and legal thought which were the
backdrop for the establishmentof the first American law school
in 1779.
THE REV. JOHN BRACKEN V. THE VISITORS OF WILLIAM
AND MARY COLLEGE: A POST-REVOLUTIONARY
PROBLEM IN VISITATORIAL JURISDICTION
J.W. BRIDGE*

Introduction
The two hundredth anniversary of the first chair of law in the
United States will occur in December, 1979. That chair was estab* Professor of Public Law, University of Exeter, England; Visiting Professor of Law, College of William and Mary in Virginia, 1977-78; Senior Fulbright-Hays Scholar, 1977-78.
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lished in the College of William and Mary in Virginia and its first
occupant was the distinguished lawyer, teacher, and patriot, George
Wythe. This pioneering development was indebted to the genius
and initiative of Thomas Jefferson, who claimed credit for it in his
autobiography, writing,
On the 1st of June, 1779, I was appointed Governor of the Commonwealth, and retired from the legislature. Being elected, also,
one of the Visitors of William and Mary College, a self-electing
body, I effected, during my residence in Williamsburg that year,
a change in the organization of that institution, by abolishing the
Grammar school, and the two professorships of Divinity and Oriental languages, and substituting a professorship of Law and Police, one of Anatomy, Medicine and Chemistry, and one of Mod -F
em Languages.'
Thus, the teaching of law, science, and modem languages at the
College was made possible by the dismissal of three professors and
the discharge of pupils at the Grammar School, which had been an
integral part of the College from its inception. Such an event immediately raises serious human and legal questions; only a firm legal
justification would support such a sweeping exercise of power affecting so many. Perhaps pride in the establishment of the first American law school2 should be tempered by thoughts of the professors
and students whose dispossession made it possible.
Two hundred years after the event, the plight of the displaced
professors and students must remain somewhat speculative.3 A
focus on the legal issues involved, however, is still possible. The text
of the College Charter4 and of the relevant College statutes are exThe author is indebted to W.H. Cowley, Emeritus Professor of Education at Stanford
University, who first drew his attention to the existence of Visitors in the United States, and
to W.F. Swindler, John Marshall Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary, for
patiently answering his many questions concerning the history of American law.

1. THE WRTNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
JEFFERSON WRMTNGS].

50 (H. Washington ed. 1853) [hereinafter cited as

2. This is still disputed by some. See D. BooasnN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL
EXPERIENCE 37 (1965); J. MORPRGO, THEM MAJESTIES' ROYALL COLLEDGE 196 (1976); Swindler,
America's First Law Schools: Significance or Chauvinism?, 41 CONN. B.J. 1 (1967).
3. Some of the discharged pupils may have continued their studies at a private school set
up by Bracken in Williamsburg. See Goodwin, The Reverend John Bracken (1745-1818), 10
354, 380.
4. The College is still governed by the Royal Charter to the extent that the Charter's

HIsT. MAGAZINE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH

provisions are not inconsistent with the Code of Virginia and the general laws of Virginia.
VA. CODE

§ 23-44.
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tant. In addition, Daniel Call's Virginia Reports contain the record
of an attempt by one of the dispossessed professors to obtain reinstatement. The 1779 reforms of the College of William and Mary
had deprived the Rev. John Bracken of his posts of Grammar School
Master and Professor of Humanity. In 1790, the Court of Appeals
of Virginia dismissed Bracken's application for a writ of mandamus
to compel Visitors of the College to restore him to his posts.5
The case of Bracken v. Visitors of William & Mary College has
attracted little attention.' All commentary to date has accepted the
propriety of the decision,' but none has subjected it to close legal
analysis. The principal purpose of this article is to remedy that
omission and consider the case in the context of the substantial
body of English law at the time it was decided.
General Gackground
The College of William and Mary in Virginia was founded in
accordance with the terms of a Charter granted by King William III
and Queen Mary II in 1693 in response to a petition from the General Assembly of the Colony." The Charter' appointed and named
eighteen trustees who were empowered "to erect, found and
establish a certain Place of universal Study, or perpetual College,
for Divinity, Philosophy, Languages, and other good Arts and
Sciences, consisting of one President, six Masters or Professors,
5. 7 Va. (3 Call) 573 (1790). Seven years later, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
dismissed a further action of Bracken's claiming arrears in salary. Bracken v. William & Mary
College, 5 Va. (1 Call) 161 (1797).
6. The fact that John Marshall appeared as counsel for the College has produced some
comment, e.g., THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 67-72 (C. Cullen & H. Johnson ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as MARSHALL PAPERS]; and has prompted comparisons with the case of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, involving the validity of the college charter as a contract
obligation under attack by the state legislature. E.g., Bartosic, With John Marshall from
William and Mary to Dartmouth College, 7 WM.& MARY L. Rlv. 259 (1966); Campbell, John
Marshall, The Virginia Political Economy and the Dartmouth College Decision, 19 Am.J.
LEGAL HiST. 40, 41 n.3 (1975); Swindler, Another Early College Charter Case, [1977] Y.B.
Sup. CT. HIsT. Soc'Y 38.

7. Robert Polk Thomson is perhaps an exception, referring to the Visitors as stretching
their powers. Thomson, The Reform of the College of William and Mary, 1763-1780, 115 PROC.
AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Soc'y 187 (1971).
8. For the text of the petition, see 1 A DocuMENTARY HISTORY OF EDUCATION INTHE SOUTH
BEFORE 1860, at 388-89 (E. Knight ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as KNIGHT].
9. The text of the Charter is published as an appendix to H. HARTWFLL, J. BLAIR & B.
CHILTON, TH PRESENT STATE OF VIRGINIA, AND THE COLLEGE (H. Farish ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as HARTwELL].
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and an hundred Scholars, more or less, graduates and nongraduates. . ... ,0 The trustees were given authority to make orders and

statutes for the regulation of the affairs of the College" and to appoint the Masters, or Professors.' 2 The property of the College initially was vested in the trustees; as soon as the College was erected
and founded, however, the trustees were required to convey that
property to the President and Masters or Professors, who were to be
incorporated as a body politic with perpetual succession.'" The incorporated society would have the power "to plead, and to be impleaded, to sue, and be sued"' 4 under a common seal. When the
transfer of property and incorporation was completed, trustees
would become functus officio, their roles fulfilled. The surviving
trustees and their successors would then assume new roles as the
"true, sole and undoubted Visitors and Governors of the said College for ever."' 5 The Visitors were to be a self-perpetuating body
with authority to make "Rules, Laws, Statutes, Orders and Injunctions" 'for the government of the College.' 6 They also were authorized to hold a court or convocation "as often as they shall think good
and see Cause" for the purpose of treating, conferring, consulting,
advising, and decreeing in connection with the statutes, orders, and
injunctions of the College."
Although only the academic organization of the College and the
duties of the faculty were outlined in the Charter, the promoters of
the College had a well-developed scheme in mind. The original proposals presented to the Virginia General Assembly in 1690'8 described a College consisting of three schools: Grammar, Philosophy,
and Divinity. These proposals recommended that the Grammar
School be served by a master and an usher, and the Divinity School
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 74, 75.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 75-78, 80.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 81.
Id. The Charter also limited these broad powers with the proviso,
provided notwithstanding, that the said Rules, Laws, Statutes, Orders and Injunctions be no way contrary to our Prerogative Royal, nor to the Laws and
Statutes of our Kingdom of England, or our Colony of Virginia, aforesaid, or to
the Canons and Constitutions of the Church of England by law establish.

Id.
17. Id. at 84, 85.
18. See 1 KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 374-75.
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by one professor. The proposals were adopted by the General Assembly, and the formal petition for a Charter submitted to the
Crown in 1691 made reference to "a free Schoole and Colledge."
Further particulars were included in the instructions to the Reverend James Blair, who was appointed to travel to England and submit the petition. 9 Blair, Commissary of the Bishop of London in
Virginia, who later became the first President of the College, was a
leading promoter of the College and undoubtedly contributed much
to the proposed scheme."0 The instructions issued to him clearly
reflect the original proposals, referring to "a Free Schoole & Colledge, wherein shall be taught the Lattin, Greek, & Hebrew tongues,
together with Philosophy, Mathematicks and Divinity.
...
s'Not
surprisingly, when the College opened its doors, the original scheme
was implemented, and the three schools were established. 22
For various reasons,23 the trustees' transfer of the College's property to the President and Masters or Professors and the subsequent
incorporation did not take place until 1729.24 By then the distribution of the six members of the faculty between the various schools
conformed to a particular pattern: one for the Grammar School, two
for the Philosophy School, two for the Divinity School, and one for
the Indian School. The statutes that Blair and Stephen Fouace, the
only other surviving trustee, appended to the transfer deed specified
this distribution. 25
Background to the Bracken Case
Little is known of the early life of John Bracken. 6 By July, 1772,
19. Id. at 387-88.
20. For accounts of Blair's role in establishing the College, see P. RoUSE, JAMES BLAIR OF
VIRGINIA 63-79 (1971); J. MORPURGO, supra note 2, at 33-34.
21. Blair's instructions are printed in 1 KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 377-80.
22. There was one major variation to the original scheme-an additional school for Indian
boys financed by a bequest from the residue of the estate of noted scientist Robert Boyle
"towards the propagating the Christian religion among the infidels." J. MORPURGO, supra note
2, at 33-34.
23. The delay was partly due to financial difficulties and partly due to the raging personal
battle between Blair and Francis Nicholson, Lieutenant Governor (1690-92) and Governor
(1698-1705) of Virginia, a promoter of the College and one of its trustees. J. MORPURGO, supra
note 2, at 49-56, 79, 80; P. RousE, supra note 20, at 152-74.
24. P. RousE, supra note 20, at 214.
25. These statutes are printed in 1 KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 500-27 (in Latin and English).
26. The best available account of Bracken's life is at Goodwin, supra note 3.
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he was in Virginia serving as a parish priest in Amelia County.2 7
Within a year of that date, whether by good fortune or good connections, he was chosen Rector of Bruton Parish, the Virginia court
church in Williamsburg and "the most coveted parish in the colony." 28 In 1775, the Mastership of the Grammar School and the
Professorship of Humanity at the College of William and Mary fell
vacant when the loyalist holder of those offices joined the Royal
Governor, Lord Dunmore, in his flight from the colony. 9 Bracken
seems to have assumed the departed professor's duties in 1775, although his appointment was not formalized until April, 1777.3 He
held these posts at the College concurrently with the Rectorship of
Bruton Parish and continued to do so until December 25, 1779. On
that date, the statute made by the Visitors of the College that
abolished the Grammar School, and with it Bracken's College
3
posts, became effective. '
The reforms of 1779 had their roots in long-standing dissatisfaction with the organization of the College that gathered momentum
and gained a final impetus from the Revolution.32 In the 1760s,
criticism began to focus on the academic disadvantages of having a
grammar school and schools for advanced students in one institution.? These criticisms increasingly were coupled with demands for
more far-reaching reforms that would transform the College into a
university in which law and medicine would be taught. The climax
of this first wave of reformist ideas was a comprehensive and detailed plan for restructuring the College that was published anony27. Id. at 355.
28. Id. at 355-56. Bracken's marriage in 1776 to the great-granddaughter of Robert "King"
Carter, owner of much of Virginia's Northern Neck and one of the wealthiest colonists, may
have helped his position considerably.
29. Bracken's predecessor at the College was the Rev. Thomas Gwatkin. The circumstances of his departure are described in J. MoRpuRGo, supra note 2, at 172-73.
30. It has been suggested that between November, 1775, and April, 1777, Bracken simply
may have been substituting for Gwatkin, who had not abandoned all hopes of returning.
Goodwin, supra note 3, at 376.
31. The statute was enacted on December 4, 1779. An extract from it is printed in 1 KNIGHT,
supra note 8, at 546-48.
32. For a detailed account of these reforms, see Thomson, supra note 7.
33. Jefferson, himself, may have been annoyed at such an arrangement. He wrote, "The
admission of the learners of Latin and Greek filled the college with children. This rendering
it disagreeable and degrading to young gentlemen already prepared for entering on the sciences . . . ." T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 150-51 (W. Peden ed. 1955)

[hereinafter cited as

JEFFERSON

NoTES].
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mously in November, 1776.11 Almost immediately the matter was
taken up by Thomas Jefferson in his capacity as a member of the
Committee of Revisers set up by the Virginia General Assembly to
carry out a revision of the laws of Virginia.5 Jefferson was given the
task of drafting "a systematical plan of general education" 3 and did
so in the form of three bills, the second of which was entitled "A Bill
for Amending the Constitution of the College of William and Mary,
and Substituting More Certain Revenues for Its Support." 3 Jefferson proposed the transfer of the activities of the Grammar School
to a new system of public schools and further, "to amend the constitution of William and Mary college, to enlarge its sphere of science,
and to make it in fact a University." 3 The scheme involved an
increased number of chairs, including fine arts, law, history, and
medicine.39 Jefferson's proposals met the fate of those of many zealous reformers throughout history; the bill was not presented to the
Virginia General Assembly until 1785 and then appears to have been
0
abandoned."
Jefferson's bill proposed that the everyday government of the College be placed in the hands of the faculty.' Further, any differences
between the faculty and the Visitors would be resolved by a group
of three Chancellors given judicial powers to settle such disputes.1'
The 1779 reforms, however, did not follow this pattern. Instead of
bolstering academic freedom, the Visitors were given a decisive
voice in matters of teaching methods. 3 Because the reforms were
carried out by the Visitors and not the Virginia legislature, the bias
favoring visitatorial authority could be anticipated. Still, the
change does reflect the tension and hostility that existed between
34. See J. MORPURGO, supra note 2, at 178; Thomson, supra note 7, at 206.
35. See generally 2 THE PAPERS OF ThoMAs JEFFERSON 305 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) [hereinafter
cited as BOYD].
36. JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 47. On Jefferson's role as an educationalist, see
R. HONEYWELL, THE EDUCATIONAL WORKS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON (1931).
37. The text of the bill is printed in 2 BOYD, supra note 35, at 535.
38. JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 48.
39. 2 BOYD, supra note 35, at 540.
40. Id. at 543. Jefferson attributed the bill's failure partly to fear that it would confirm
Anglican ascendancy at the College, which was an establishment of the Church of England.
JEFFERSON WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 48.
41. See 2 BOYD, supra note 35, at 540.
42. Id. at 549.

43. See 1 KNIGHT, supra note 8,at 547.
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the faculty and the Visitors." Thus, Bracken's action against the
Visitors, while directly prompted by the 1779 reforms, was also the
culmination of long-standing bitterness and rivalry between the
faculty and the Visitors.
Bracken has been credited with a hot temper, 5 but he did not
make his first move against the College until about September,
1782. On September 1st, the faculty decided to retain Edmund
Randolph as counsel for the College "in case Mr. Bracken should
commence any Suit against the Society for arrears of Salary or for
any other cause."" Bracken did not file suit against the Visitors
until October, 1787, however. 7 This prolonged delay may have been
the result of attempts to settle the matter or to persuade Bracken
to drop the action. But Bracken wanted restoration to his College
posts, and his obduracy seems to have aroused the passions of
everyone involved. In a letter dated December 14, 1789, Thomas
Jefferson commented on George Wythe's resignation from the
Chair of Law and Police, indicating that Wythe was "disgusted
with some conduct of the professors, and particularly of the exprofessor Bracken and perhaps too with himself for having suffered
himself to be too much irritated with that."' 8 At that time Bracken's
action was still awaiting judgment. The General Court of Virginia
found the case difficult and adjourned it to the court of appeals.49
On December 8, 1790, that court dismissed Bracken's action. No
reasoned judgment was given; the court merely stated that it
reached its decision "on the merits of the case." 50
Counsel's Arguments in the Bracken Case
Bracken sought a writ of mandamus against the Visitors, directing them to restore him "to his place and office of grammar Master,
and professor of humanity." 5 ' Bracken was represented by John
44. See generally J. MoRPURo, supra note 2, at 97-155.
45. Thomson, supra note 7, at 198.
46. Journalof the Meetings of the Presidentand Masters of William and Mary College, 15
WM. & MARY COLLEGE Q. HisT. MAGAZINE (First Series) 1, 267 (1906) [hereinafter cited as

Journal of the Meetings].
47. Bracken v. Visitors of Wm. & Mary College, 7 Va. (3 Call) 573, 579 (1790).
48. 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 22-23 (P. Ford ed. 1904) [hereinafter cited as
FORD].

49. 7 Va. (3 Call) at 579.

50. Id. at 599.
51. Id. at 579.
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Taylor; the Visitors were represented by John Marshall. The fundamental issue before the court was the legality of the reforms carried
out by the Visitors in 1779. The parties were in agreement that in
absence of any amending Virginia legislation, the Royal Charter of
the College retained its legal validity," but counsel differed in their
approach to interpreting the Charter.
Marshall opened the proceedings on behalf of the Visitors and his
argument, on the whole, was neither very sophisticated nor technical. He urged that, subject only to a few fundamental Charter provisions, the Visitors were given very broad powers. Marshall submitted that these fundamental provisions established "that there
should be a president and six professors: and, perhaps, that divinity, philosophy and the languages should be taught in the College." 53
Since Bracken's action arose out of the abolition of the Grammar
School, Marshall further contended that only the part of the 1779
Statutes relating to the Grammar School was in issue. He was influenced by the fact that there was no express reference to the Grammar School in the Charter and therefore concluded that the abolition of the Grammar School fell within the Visitors' general authority to make regulations for the College: "Their power of legislation
. . . extended to the modification of the schools, in any manner they
should deem proper, provided they did not depart from the great
outlines marked in the Charter: which are divinity, philosophy and
the languages."54 On the specific issue of the application for mandamus, Marshall contended that because the Grammar School had
been abolished lawfully, Bracken's posts no longer existed. Therefore, mandamus would not lie to restore a professor to a non-existent
office.55
These arguments defending the action of the Visitors were based
partially on English case law concerning the authority of Visitors of
eleemosynary corporations. 5 The case law, within limits, recognized
52. Taylor eloquently stated that "the charter is the magnet, from whence every part of
this business must take its direction. It is the constitution of the College, and, like all other
constitutions, ought to be preserved inviolate." Id. at 581. Marshall openly conceded the
point. "Much argument has been used to prove, that the Visitors are bound by the College
charter. . . . That is a position I never designed to controvert." Id. at 595.
53. Id. at 596.
54. Id. at 580.
55. Id. at 581.
56. Marshall relied on The King v. The Bishop of Ely, 1 Black. W. 72, 96 Eng. Rep. 39
(K.B. 1756); The King v. The Bishop of Chester, 1 Black. W. 22, 96 Eng. Rep. 12 (K.B. 1747);
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the exclusive nature of visitatorial authority. But perhaps the most
important aspect of Marshall's pleading was his emphasis on a flexible approach to interpreting the Charter-an approach that could
reflect the needs of the time.57 As a recent commentator explained:
In a certain sense it was a plea for the right of the board of visitors
to replace the traditional professorships instituted in the seventeenth century with a new academic staff competent to teach
subjects that the board emphasized in the new curriculum.
Rather than turning to an interpretation of the charter, Marshall
supported a principle of flexibility in educational policy that
would in most cases not be restricted by the exact terms of the
5
1693 document. 1
The arguments of John Taylor, Bracken's counsel, however, were
based on a close analysis of the documents constituting the College,
in striking contrast to Marshall's approach. Taylor attempted to
convince the court that, first, for the purposes of its government the
College had a corporate nature; second, the powers of the Visitors
were not only subject to the Charter but also to the Transfer Deed
and the original Statutes made by the surviving trustees; and third,
the Visitors had acted ultra vires. 59 Taylor regarded the Charter, the
Transfer Deed, and the original Statutes as comprising the constitution of the College. He asserted that a body such as the College was
created by and subordinate to its constitution, which the College
was forbidden to either violate or change by its own act. In the
context of William and Mary, he based his view on an examination
of the respective roles of the trustees, the Visitors, and the faculty.
Taylor argued that the Charter gave to the trustees the power and
duty to establish the College, and until that duty had been accomplished, the Visitors had no existence, let alone authority."0 The
trustees' duty was accomplished by means of the Transfer Deed and
the Statutes annexed to it. Therefore, Taylor maintained, the Visiand Philips v. Bury, 1 Ld. Raym. 5, 91 Eng. Rep. 900 (K.B. 1694). Based on such precedent,

the court admitted as law the proposition that mandamus would not lie in the case of a
private eleemosynary institution where visitors were appointed. 7 Va. (3 Call) at 580.

57. "In institutions, therefore, which are to be durable, only great leading and general
principles, ought to be immutable . . . . [A] particular branch of science, which at one
period of time would be deemed all important, might at another, be thought not worth
acquiring." 7 Va. (3 Call) at 581.
58. MARSHALL PAPERS, supra note 6, at 70.

59. 7 Va. (3 Call) at 581.
60. Id.
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tors' authority was subordinate to and limited by those documents
which were the means of fulfilling the intentions of the Royal founders of the College.'
Against this background, Taylor then argued that the Visitors'
reforms of 1779 exceeded their powers. He referred specifically to the
Charter's express commitment to religion and its teaching, which
was abandoned after 1779, and to the substitution of the teaching
of modern languages for ancient languages. 2 Taylor regarded the
action of the Visitors as an unlawful assumption of the power to
create schools that the Charter gave only to the trustees: "By the
constitution of the College, the Visitors were to make Statutes for
6 3
the government of the College; not for its erection or abolition.
For these reasons, Taylor concluded that "this visitorial act of 1779,
so far from being warranted by, is subversive of the College Charter,
and that it exceeds any visitorial power."6 He argued that mandamus would lie for his client because the College was not a private
eleemosynary corporation but "a corporation for public government
. . .whose proceedings must therefore be subject to the control of
this Court." 5
The different approaches of Marshall and Taylor to the interpretation of the Charter strike a modern note. Marshall adopted
a liberal, flexible approach; he accepted the Charter as binding
but was willing to interpret it in a creative, innovative way in response to the changes in educational needs resulting from both
the Revolution and the simple passage of time. Taylor, on the other
hand, was a strict constructionist whose avowed aim was to discern
the intentions of the original founders of the College and interpret
66
the Charter accordingly.
61. Id. at 582-83.
62. Id. at 584-85.
63. Id. at 587.
64. Id. at 589. The act being void, there was nothing to deprive Bracken of his office or
salary.
65. Id. at 590. The College had the right to elect a member to the General Assembly, and
through control of the office of Surveyor General, could appoint all the surveyors to the
different counties throughout Virginia.
66. This early confrontation between two schools of constitutional thought was a foreshadowing of the future. Taylor later became one of the earliest supporters of states' rights.
Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) annoyed Taylor
considerably and prompted him to write his Construction Construed and Constitutions
Vindicated in 1820.
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Evaluation of the Bracken Case in the Light of PrevailingEnglish
Law
By the time Bracken's action was heard, English law concerning
chartered corporations had reached a high state of development."
The College of William and Mary clearly was established in accordance with that law, although special features of this colonial educational venture necessitated some modifications in procedure. In late
seventeenth century England, a new college would not have appeared overnight, but normally no undue delay would have occurred. In England, aided by past precedent, a charter would have
been granted with the necessary endowments, and the collegiate
society would have been established and supplied with a regulatory
code of statutes. In colonial Virginia, however, the situation was
novel and beset by the uncertainties of distance and finance. The
process leading to the establishment of William and Mary as an
operational institution necessarily was prolonged. Partly for this
reason the Charter resorted to the expedient of creating a body of
local trustees to represent and act on behalf of the Royal founders.
The Charter gave the trustees authority "to erect, found, and establish ' 6 s the College in accordance with the founders' intentions as
soon as local circumstances permitted.
Such a course of action was not in itself novel. The Crown could
delegate authority to private persons, subject to the strict terms of
the Royal grant, to establish a corporation, to appoint its members,
and to determine the way it shall be maintained. Such a corporation remained a Royal foundation notwithstanding the use of intermediaries: William and Mary falls into this category. The trustees
must have intended not only to erect the College and vest its property in the President and Masters, but also to exercise the legislative
power that the Charter gave them to provide a set of rules to govern
its corporate life. The Charter dealt in generalities and did not
completely reflect the proposals for the College that had been accepted by the Crown, particularly the provision for the Grammar
School. Therefore, the similarity between the Statutes made by the
trustees and the proposals for the Charter was not chance, rather
67. See generally 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
wood ed. 1893) [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE].
68. HARTWELL, supra note 9, at 74.
69. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at 379-82.

376-91 (G. Shars-
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this must have been intended from the beginning. 0 Who better than
James Blair, not only a surviving trustee but the man who actually
had negotiated the Royal Charter, would be aware of the promoters'
plans for the College and the Royal affirmation of them. As noted
earlier, the trustees were not in a position to accomplish the Royal
intentions until 1729, and although some memories may have become dulled during the intervening years, Blair's certainly had not.
This long-delayed exercise of legislative authority by the trustees
was patently designed to realize the original aims of the Charter.
Those aims can be understood fully only when the Charter is read
together with the original Statutes that amplified and perfected the
bare Charter outline. John Taylor's argument that the scope of the
Visitors' authority must be decided in the light of the Charter, the
Transfer Deed, and the original Statutes was fully justified.
The institution of Visitors followed long-established English legal
practice and was to be expected in the establishment of a College
by Royal Charter." In its earliest form, visitation appears to have
been an ecclesiastical device for supervising the administration of
the church and the correction of offenses at diocesan and parochial
levels." In the course of time the institution of visitors was extended
to certain lay corporations that had strong ecclesiastical connections. These were known as eleemosynary corporations, founded for
the promotion of learning and the support of persons engaged in
literary pursuits. 3 The classic examples of eleemosynary corporations are the individual colleges of the English Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. In contrast, lay corporations with purely secural origins and purposes were not subject to visitation but were
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. 4 In Philips v.
Bury, 5 which was before the English courts at the time William
and Mary received its charter, the nature of these two types of lay
70. Both the statutes and Charter were based on the only models acceptable to most
Virginians; these were the administrative pattern common in British universities. J.
MORPURGO, supra note 2, at 80.
71. See Bridge, Keeping Peace in the Universities:The Role of the Visitor, 86 LAw Q. REV.
531 (1970). See generally H.

PICARDA, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO CHARITIES

(1977);

see also Patel v. University of Bradford, [1978] 3 All E.R. 841.
72. See G. MOORE, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH CANON LAw 45, 47-49 (1967); R. RODES, ECCLESIASTICAL ADMINISTRATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 135-38 (1977).

73. See Bridge, supra note 71, at 532-33.
74. Id.
75. 1 Ld. Raym. 5, 91 Eng. Rep. 900 (K.B. 1694).
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corporation and the role of visitors were settled. In an opinion which
subsequently was upheld by the House of Lords, 7 Sir John Holt
distinguished two types of corporations: a civil corporation, having
exclusively secular origins, and an eleemosynary corporation, for
private charity. A civil corporation, Holt stated, was not subject to
its founder or visitors but to the general law of the land, while an
eleemosynary corporation was the creature of its founder and sub77
ject to the jurisdiction of the visitors appointed by him.
One of the issues in the Bracken case was the corporate nature of
the College of William and Mary. John Taylor pointed to certain
public aspects of the College and argued that it was "a corporation
for public government. ' 7 8 John Marshall, on the other hand, relying
expressly on Sir John Holt's opinion, argued that it was an eleemosynary corporation and, as such, subject to the jurisdiction of its
Visitors.7 9 On this issue Marshall clearly had a strong and convincing argument. The College, modeled on the precedents of Oxford
and Cambridge, was established expressly "for promoting the Studies of true Philosophy, Languages, and other good Arts and Sciences, and for propagating the pure Gospel of Christ:" 0 in other
words, for eleemosynary purposes. The College's public aspects were
incidental and peripheral to those purposes. As an eleemosynary
corporation, it was "wholly subject to the rules, laws, statutes and
ordinances which the founder ordains, and to the visitor whom he
appoints, and to no others ...
."I' The duty of a visitor, under the
common law, was to judge according to the statutes governing the
2
college, to remove unfit faculty members, and to hear appeals.
These expressions of English legal authority concerning the powers
and duties of visitors were applicable to William and Mary because
its Charter expressly provided that the acts of the Visitors "be no
way contrary to our Prerogative Royal, nor the the laws and Statutes
of our Kingdom of England, or our Colony of Virginia, .
or to the
76. Philips v. Bury, 1 Shower 35, 1 Eng. Rep. 24 (H.L. 1694).
77. 1 Ld. Raym. at 8, 91 Eng. Rep. at 902-03.
78. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
79. Marshall associated the College with private charitable hospitals, each founded with
charitable funds and subject to the will of the founder. "In many of the cases, colleges and
hospitals are classed together as private eleemosynary corporations.
... Id. at 591-92.
80. HARTWELL, supra note 9, at 74.
81. 1 Ld. Raym. at 8, 91 Eng. Rep. at 902-03.
82. Id., 91 Eng. Rep. at 903.
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canons and constitutions of the Church of England by law estab83
lished."
The Visitors were bound by the scheme set ,out in the Charter in
its character as the constitution of the College, 4 because even when
visitors were given legislative authority, that authority did not extend to altering the general constitution of the corporation.8 This
is an application of the general rule "that a grant made by the
Crown at the suit of a subject is to be taken most beneficially for
the Crown and against the subject; in other words, the subject has
no right to claim under a grant or charter anything which the Crown
has not granted by express, clear and unambiguous terms." 8 One
of the results of the Visitors' reforms of 1779 was the abolition of the
teaching of divinity, which was one of the express objects of the
Charter. On this point Taylor clearly had an impregnable case.
Marshall wisely chose not to emphasize the issue of divinity, although he did admit that it was one of "the great outlines marked
in the Charter"87 from which the Visitors should not depart. As
Taylor expressed it, "The old charter has the support of religion for
an object. The modern one exchanges it for the 'rarer parts of science as more immediately subordinate to the leading objects of
society'." 8 Even if the Visitors' legislative powers were given the
most generous interpretation, those powers could not be used, in the
absence of express authority, to change a fundamental feature of the
Charter. This aspect of the 1779 reforms was patently ultra vires.
Bracken's action, of course, was not related directly to the divinity issue but to the abolition of the Grammar School. Accordingly,
Marshall concentrated his arguments on that aspect of the Visitors'
actions. As previously indicated, although there was no mention of
the Grammar School in the Charter, it was an important part of the
scheme presented to the Crown 9 and figured predominantly in the
original Statutes made by the surviving trustees at the time of the
incorporation of the College. The critical question is whether the
83. HARTWELL, supra note 9, at 81.
84. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
85. See Ex parte Bolton School, 2 Bro. C.C. 661, 29 Eng. Rep. 367 (Ch. 1789).
86. 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 739 (4th ed. Lord Hailsham 1974). See also 2
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

87.
88.
89.
90.

7 Va. (3 Call) at 580-81.
Id. at 584.
See 1 KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 388-89.
Id. at 509-13.

664 (G. Sharswood ed. 1890).
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Visitors were bound by those original Statutes or whether they had
complete discretion to change them by virtue of their legislative
authority. In other words, when Sir John Holt, in Philips v. Bury,
said that visitors should "judge according to the statutes of the
college,"'" did he intend this to apply to the original statutes creating the College or those statutes as amended from time to time by
the Visitors?
In a case decided in the 1750s, the King's Bench held that a visitor
could not alter the original statutes.92 In the context of an English
college, the statutes would have been part of the complete "Charter
package" enacted close to the time of the Charter itself to elaborate
upon the structure outlined therein in accordance with the founder's
intentions. Clearly the power of the visitors would be subject to
those statutes. In the case of William and Mary, the founder's authority to enact statutes was delegated to trustees, whose exercise
of that authority was delayed substantially. Nevertheless, the statutes made by the trustees in 1728 were in a real sense "founders"
statutes because they were designed to fulfill the objectives of the
scheme approved by the Crown, which included provision for a
Grammar School. If this proposition is sound, then the Visitors were
bound by those statutes, and their abolition of the Grammar School
was ultra vires.
The Visitors' legislative powers under the Charter were "full and
absolute Liberty, Power and Authority, of making, enacting, framing and establishing such and so many Rules, Laws, Statutes, Orders and Injunctions, for the good and wholesome governnment of
the said College, as to them . . . and their Successors, shall from
time to time, according to their various Occasions and Circumstances, seem most fit and expedient."9 3 That the exercise of these powers was subject to the laws of England and Virginia and to the
91. 1 Ld. Raym. at 8, 91 Eng. Rep. at 903.
92. St. Johns College v. Todington, 1 Burr. 158, 201, 97 Eng. Rep. 245, 270 (K.B. 1757)
(opinion of Lord Mansfield) ("[Wihere the body of statutes has been given by the founder,
');
I should doubt extremely 'whether a visitor can alter those statutes or give new laws ...
accord, Green v. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. Sen. 462, 472, 27 Eng. Rep. 1144, 1149 (Ch. 1750)
(opinion of Lord Hardwicke) ("If there are particular statutes, they are . . . [the visitor's]
rule, he is bound by them; and if he acts contrary to or exceeds them, acts without jurisdiction; the question being still open whether he has acted within his jurisdiction or not, if not
his act is a nullity.")
93. HARTWELL, supra note 9, at 81.
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canons of the Church of England 4 has been noted already. The
prevailing view of the English courts was that, in the absence of
express authority, Visitors could not change the constitution of a
chartered corporation. Thus, as general and broad as the powers of
the William and Mary Visitors were, they were not given the express
authority necessary to alter the constitution of the College.
Evidence suggests that, even prior to the 1779 reforms, those concerned with the affairs of the College were aware of the legal restraints on the powers of the Visitors. In 1768, at the height of an
earlier dispute between the Visitors and the faculty, the faculty
wrote to Richard Terrick, Chancellor of the College: "[T]he Remedy for the Disorders of which both the Visitors & we complain must
come from some higher Power to which both they & we are bound
to submit, whether that shall take its Rise from Petition to the King
for a new Charter, or from an Appeal to His-Majesty as supreme
Visitor of the College, which we suppose him to be . ... ,," Thus,
the argument was that any fundamental change in the constitution
of the College could be accomplished only by the Crown." This view
seems to have been shared by the Chancellor himself. Two years
earlier, he had told the Visitors that their claim of the power to
arbitrarily change statutes and narrowly construct the conduct of
the professors placed the College on a foundation so fundamentally
wrong that William and Mary could never contribute to the advancement of religion and learning. 7
After the Revolution, the College of William and Mary was, as the
English Attorney-General phrased it, "no longer a corporation with
respect to this country, as a creature of the great seal of this country."98 The power to change the Charter and original Statutes was
vested now in the General Assembly of the newly-independent Virginia as Jefferson's Bill for Amending the Constitution of the College of William and Mary implied. That bill referred to certain
94. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
95. Journalof the Meetings, supra note 46, at 229.
96. A revision of a charter could not take place on the initiative of the Crown; rather, it
required the consent of the corporation. See The King v. Pasmore, 3 T.R. 199, 240, 100 Eng.
Rep. 531, 553 (K.B. 1789).
97. Thomson, supra note 7, at 195.
98. Attorney General ex. rel. Bishop of London v. College of William and Mary, 1 Ves. Jun.
243, 244, 30 Eng. Rep. 323, 323 (Ch. 1790). This case involved an unsuccessful attempt
after the Revolution to restore payment to the. College of the Boyle bequest for the education
of Indian boys. See note 22 supra.
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articles in the College's constitution "which being fixed by the original Charter . . . cannot be reformed by the said trustees, whose
powers are created and circumscribed by the said charter."99 An
express aim of the bill was that in future the Visitors should not "be
restrained in their legislation, by the royal prerogative, or the laws
of the kingdom of England;. . . or the canons or constitution of the
English Church, as enjoined in the said charter."'0 0 These provisions
recognized that unless and until the Virginia General Assembly
exercised its power to amend the constitution of the College, the
College remained subject to the law of England. When Jefferson
proposed his reforms in 1779, he departed from the path of legal
orthodoxy as expressed in his bill. He still regarded the Charter as
binding, but only regarding the number of professorships, not the
subject curriculum of the professorships.' 0' This position is manifestly untenable. Logically, the subject areas antecede the professorships which are designed to serve them. Jefferson's construction
clearly was an exercise in special pleading designed to justify the
redirection of the College's reduced resources to purposes that fitted
Jefferson's educational plans. 0°
The arguments that have been advanced here lead to the conclusion that the Visitors of the College of William and Mary had an
enlarged and legally unjustifiable view of their role and authority.
The explanation for their position lies partly in the ready availability of the Visitors. They were able to concern themselves with the
minutiae of College activities rather than remaining remote figures
like their English counterparts who visited at relatively infrequent
intervals. 0 3 This parochial character of the College, accentuated by
its physical isolation and fed by local pride, produced a climate in
which animosity developed between the professional academicians
and their lay Visitors. These circumstances surrounding the College
made it difficult for its Visitors to adopt the limited role that the
Charter and original Statutes clearly assigned to them. Upon incorporation, the President and professors acquired a legal status conferred directly upon them by the Charter; 4 such status was inde99. See 2 BOYD, supra note 35, at 538.
100. Id. at 539.

101. See

JEFFERSON NOTES,

supra note 33, at 151.

102. See the extracts from the 1779 Statutes printed in 1 KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 547.
103. See Thomson, supra note 7, at 188-89.
104. See HARTWELL, supra note 9, at 78-81.
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pendent of and in no way subservient to that of the Visitors. The
original Statutes established a separation of powers between the
President and professors, and the Visitors. The ordinary government of the College"° ' was vested in the president and professors.
Lesser matters were to be dealt with by "the President's order by
word of mouth;" more serious matters were to be dealt with at
meetings of the faculty.' The Visitors, described as the "College
Senate" in the original Statutes,' °7 were required to "maintain and
support the ordinary authority of the President and Masters in the
administration of the daily government of the College, and [to]
refer all common domestick complaints to them."'"" The Visitors
were not to be troubled "except in matters of great moment, where
there is some Difficulty to be got over, or some Corruption or ill
Practice to be reformed, or a new Statute to be made, or some other
weighty Business to be transacted."'' ° As the Charter expressly directed, these visitatorial powers were to be exercised at occasional
courts or convocations."' In accordance with English academic tradition, the role of the Visitors Was not to create or change the College, but to provide assistance, advice, and support in-the running
of the College as established. As John Taylor explained, "In the
creation [of the College], the Crown used the medium of trustees.
It was necessary that the work of the trustee should be completed,
before the visitors could act at all. The very term visitors implies
so much: Something was to be visited. This something was the
College establishment, as fixed by the charter and trustees. It was
to be visited, for the purpose of supporting it, according to the laws
of the founder, not for the purpose of subverting those laws.""'
THE CHOICE OF REMEDY

If the action of the Visitors in discontinuing the teaching of divinity, abolishing the Grammar School, and dismissing members of the
105. "Let the ordinary Government of the College be in the President and the Six Masters." 1 KNIGHT, supra note 8,at 519.
106. More serious matters included statutes found inconvenient or needing change,
"election" of officers necessary for College business such as workmen and library keepers, and
complaints and grievances. Id.
107. Id. at 507.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See HARTWELL, supra note 9, at 84-85.
111. 7 Va. (3 Call) at 583-84.
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faculty was in fact ultra vires, the question of availability of a judicial remedy remained. By the time Bracken's action was brought,
the principle that visitatorial jurisdiction was both exclusive and
final was settled law. Sir John Holt, in Philipsv. Bury, stressed that
visitors' "determinations are final, and examinable in no other court
whatsoever.""' Lord Mansfield succinctly stated in a later case that
"a visitor. . . is a summary Judge and a Judge without appeal.", 3
The justification for this absolute authority is based on both legal
and public policy considerations. Someone who founds an eleemosynary corporation is legally entitled to have that foundation conducted in accordance with his wishes. In the words of Lord Hardwicke:
The original of all . . . [visitatorial] power is the property of
donor [sic], and the power every one has to dispose, direct, and
regulate his own property; ... therefore if either the crown or the
subject creates an eleemosynary foundation, and vests the charity in the persons who are to receive the benefit of it, since a
contest might arise about the government of it, the law allows the
founder or his heirs, or the person especially appointed by him
to be visitor, to determine according to his own creature ...
[The] nature of this power is forum domesticum, the private
jurisdiction of the founder . .. .
The justification based on public policy was that actions involving
eleemosynary corporations before the courts "may take off these
learned bodies from their studies, and ingross their time very improperly."1 5 That the Visitors of William and Mary were intended to
fit into this pattern emerges from both the Charter and the original
Statutes.
In accordance with settled English law, when Visitors act within
the scope of their authority, their actions are not open to challenge
in the courts. This principle also applies to Visitors' exercise of
discretionary powers, provided the action taken is within the limits
of the discretion: "cases showe that the acts of a visitor, whether
right or wrong, are not to be examined in the Courts of Law; but
those are cases where he has acted within his jurisdiction, and they
112.
113.
114.
115.

1 Ld. Raym. at 8, 91 Eng. Rep. at 903.
The King v. The Bishop of Ely, 1 Black. W. 71, 82, 96 Eng. Rep. 39, 44 (K.B. 1756).
Green v. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. Sen. 462, 472, 27 Eng. Rep. 1144, 1149 (Ch. 1750).
Attorney General v. Talbot, 3 Atk. 662, 676, 26 Eng. Rep. 1181, 1188 (Ch. 1747).
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proceed upon this principle, that he is the judge whom the founder
has thought proper to appoint.""' 8 The William and Mary Visitors
were given discretionary legislative power. The Charter confers this
power with the express intent that it should be exercised in a way
which "shall from time to time, according to their various Occasions
and Circumstances, seem most fit and expedient." 1 7 This same
discretionary power was enunciated further in the final clause of the
original Statutes which says that, under the Charter, the Visitors
"may add new statutes, or may even change these, as their Affairs
and Circumstances from Time to Time shall require."'" 8 That
clause, however, was incapable of giving the Visitors any powers
greater than those they were given under the Charter itself. The
Charter subjected them to the general law and did not give them
the necessary power required by that law to enable them to change
the constitution of the College. Thus, the Visitors' power to change
the original Statutes was limited to matters of detail and not of
substance, making their 1779 reforms beyond the scope of their
authority.
English case law clearly indicates that the courts could intervene
in such a case. In an authority relied upon by Marshall, the court
said, " [Tihere is no doubt that this Court will interpose in one way
or other whenever any person takes upon him to exercise a jurisdiction which he has not . . . .'" Similarly, in another case of the
same period, "If there are particular statutes, they are . . . [the
Visitor's] rule, he is bound by them; and if he acts contrary to or
exceeds them, he acts without jurisdiction."'' 10 But the mandamus
sought by Bracken was not an available remedy. Mandamus will lie
against visitors in certain circumstances, as for example ti compel
them to obey the general law.' 2' If a visitor refuses to act when he is
under a legal duty to do so, mandamus may be used to compel him
to act, although not as a means of interfering in the actual exercise
116. The King v. The Bishop of Ely, 2 T.R. 290, 336, 100 Eng. Rep. 157, 181 (K.B. 1788)
(opinion of Ashhurst, J.).
117. HARTWELL, supra note 9, at 81.
118. 1 KNIGHT, supra note 8, at 527.
119. The King v. The Bishop of Chester, 1 Wils. K.B. 206, 209, 95 Eng. Rep. 576, 577 (K.B.
1747) (opinion of Lee, C.J.).
120. Green v. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. Sen. at 472, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1149-50 (opinion of Lord
Hardwicke).
121. See The King v. St. John's College, 4 Mod. 368, 87 Eng. Rep. 448 (K.B. 1694).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:415

of his authority. 2 2 Failure to observe any procedural requirements3
of the charter and statutes also may be remedied by mandamus.'
But for the purpose for which Bracken sought mandamus, reinstatement, it was not available. Mandamus clearly will not lie to restore
a fellow of a College.' Taylor seems to have been influenced in his
choice of mandamus as a remedy by his conviction that William and
Mary was not an eleemosynary corporation but rather a public corporation subject entirely to the jurisdiction of the courts. That was
the fatal flaw in his argument. If he had conceded the eleemosynary
nature of the College, there were other remedies that he could have
sought on behalf of his client.
The writ of prohibition was one alternative.'25 Prohibition, a remedy of great antiquity, can be used by the courts to prevent a person
or body endowed with judicial authority from exceeding his or its
jurisdiction.'2 6 Marshall asserted that in this case the Visitors were
exercising legislative and not judicial powers.' 7 But this abusive
exercise of legislative power had the direct consequence of depriving
Bracken of his membership in the College's corporate body.
Bracken's case is comparable to Bently v. Bishop of Ely, 28 in which
a visitor abused his authority by expelling the Master of a College.
There the court granted prohibition to prevent such an unauthorized expulsion.' 29 In The King v. The Bishop of Ely, the court regarded questions about the membership of corporations as essentially judicially in nature: "The exercise of a Visitor's power . . . is
a judicial act; and a Judge cannot determine without hearing the
parties concerned.' 3 As Taylor argued, the Visitors' power of dismissal was only for cause,' 3 ' and, as Marshall conceded, "Mr.
122. See The King v. The Bishop of Ely, 2 T.R. 290, 100 Eng. Rep. 157 (K.B. 1788).
123. See id. at 338 n.(a), 100 Eng. Rep. at 182 n.(a).
124. E.g., Mr. Parkinson's Case, 3 Mod. 265, 87 Eng. Rep. 175 (K.B. 1689).
125. Certiorari was not available because the system of law administered by a visitor was
the law of the founder and not the law ordinarily applied by courts. Gordon, Certiorarito an
Ecclesiastical Court, 63 LAW Q. REV. 208 (1947).
126. For the application of prohibition to visitors, see Bridge, supra note 71, at 544-45.
127. 7 Va. (3 Call) at 588.
128. 1 Barn. K.B. 192, 94 Eng. Rep. 132 (1729).
129. Id.
130. The King v. The Bishop of Ely, 2 T.R. 290, 336, 100 Eng. Rep. 157, 181 (K.B. 1788).
131. Such a vacancy must have been created by death, resignation, or deprivation. Deprivation is a technical term meaning loss of employment for delinquency or good cause. 7 Va.
(3 Call) at 586, 589.
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Bracken has not been complained of."' 3 2 The action of the William

and Mary Visitors thus is doubly to be condemned; it was not only
an unlawful exercise of legislative power but also an unlawful means
of depriving three members of the corporation of their positions.
Further, even where a visitor has a power of deprivation, "he should
. . . [use] it in a formal manner, and should at least ....

[convene] the parties interested to give them an opportunity of
making a defence."' 33 This supports Taylor's contention that
Bracken should have been summoned and heard before being deprived, and then only for some delinquency or other good cause.'34
Given the Visitors' personal commitment to their reforms, Bracken
could not have expected an objective determination of his position.
If he had sought and obtained a writ of prohibition in good time,
however, it would have had the effect of preventing the Visitors from
continuing with3 the course of action that eventually deprived him
of his position.'

1

On the basis of obiter dicta in two mid-eighteenth century cases,
two other remedies might have been available to Bracken. The first
is an action for damages: "an action for damages will lie against the
visitor for exceeding his jurisdiction .

"..."I36
Of

course, a success-

ful action of this sort would not have restored Bracken to his College
posts, but would have compensated him for his loss.'37 Secondly,
Bracken might have had grounds for an action in ejectment. In The
King v. The Bishop of Chester, 31 the court refused to grant mandamus to restore a person to a canonry because that remedy was not
available against a visitor. In addition to discussing the availability
of prohibition, two judges suggested the appropriateness of an action in ejectment.'35 Presumably, the possessory action in ejectment
132. Id. at 598.
133. The King v. The Bishop of Ely, 2 T.R. at 336, 100 Eng. Rep. at 181.
134..7 Va. (3 Call) at 589-90.
135. See Green v. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. Sen. at 471, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1149 (opinion of Lord
Hardwicke); The King v. The Bishop of Chester, 1 Wils. K.B. at 209, 95 Eng. Rep. at 577
(opinion of Lee, C.J.).
136. Green v. Rutherforth, 1 Ves. Sen. at 470, 27 Eng. Rep. at 1148 (opinion of Sir John
Strange).
137. This is comparable to Bracken's later action for arrears in salary since both turned
upon the legality of his deprivation. See Bracken v. William & Mary College, 5 Va. (1 Call)
161 (1797).
138. 1 Wils. K.B. 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 576 (K.B. 1747).
139. See id. at 209, 95 Eng. Rep. at 577-78 (opinions of Lee, C.J., and Dennison, J.).
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was available because of the relationship between a canonry and the
corporeal property of the church in question. A similar analogy
might have been drawn in Bracken's suit between a fellowship and
the corporeal property of the College; however, there appears to be
no reported instances of actions either for damages or for ejectment
14
being brought against visitors.
CONCLUSIONS

The burden of this Article has been to demonstrate that English
corporate law and usage did not, as has been suggested recently,"4
support the case of the Visitors of the College of William and Mary
in defending the action brought against them by the Rev. John
Bracken. The argument has been made that their 1779 reforms were
unlawful; more than stretching their legal powers, the Visitors
abused them. If these arguments are sound, then why did the Virginia Court of Appeals decide in favor of the Visitors? There were
perhaps two principal reasons for this: one a technical legal reason
and the other a practical political one.
From the legal point of view, John Taylor's general conception of
the role of the Visitors and their relationship with the faculty was
in accordance with English law and academic tradition. He made a
fatal error of judgment, however, either through misunderstanding
or lack of information; he did not concede that the College was an
eleemosynary corporation. Taylor was confident that it was a public
corporation and subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, hence, his
insistence on mandamus as a remedy. He seems to have been unaware of the possible availability of the writ of prohibition and other
remedies against college visitors. The unavailability of law books
and reports, aggravated by post-Revolutionary confusion and uncertainty, must have caused problems in colonial times. There is evidence, however, that copies of both Blackstone's Commentaries and
Matthew Bacon's New Abridgement of the Law were available in
Virginia during this period.4 2 Both works deal with corporations,
140. In any event, Bracken was restored to his posts in 1792 when the Grammar School
was re-established and was President of the College fron 1812 to 1814. Goodwin, supra note
3, at 383, 386-87.

141. See

MARSHALL PAPERS,

supra note 6, at 70.

142. See Swindler, John Marshall's Preparationfor the Bar-Some Observations on His
Law Notes, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 207, 207-08 (1967).
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visitation, and remedies against visitors.'
The decision in the Bracken case reflected the mood of the times.
The political arguments were against Bracken. The period was a
time of change; a time to break the old English mold and cast a new
Virginia one. This feeling was fostered by the recent history of the
College. Repeated struggles between the faculty and the Visitors
had tarnished the image of the College, prompting feelings that the
College, as established, had not lived up to expectations. Against
this background, Bracken, as a representative of the "Old Order",
clearly was at a disadvantage. The political context of the case also
may have been a source of the difficulty the Virginia courts had with
it and may explain the laconic nature of the judgment.
Additionally, George Wythe's opinion on the Bracken case is worthy of speculation. As a scholarly and experienced lawyer, he probably was familiar with the law relating to visitors.' Indeed, Wythe
may have been the source of the legal advice that formed the basis
of the faculty letter to the Chancellor in 1768 suggesting that their
dispute with the Visitors was determinable only by a higher
power.' The reforms of 1779 had provided him with his Chair; yet
ten years later he resigned, at least in part because of Bracken's
conduct. 46 The source of Wythe's irritation could have been uneasiness over the questionable legality of the Visitors' action; Wythe
was, after all, an early constitutionalist. In his well-known opinion
in Commonwealth v. Caton concerning the powers of legislators, he
observed, "[Plointing to the constitution, [I] . . . will say, to
them, here is the limit of your authority; and, hither, shall you go,
but no further."'4 7
Finally, the fact that the happenings at William and Mary helped
fashion a form of collegiate and university government which has
become a hallmark of the American system of higher education
should not be overlooked. As two modern commentators ably explain its significance: "[Tihe reform of William and Mary. . . was
a major episode in the history of higher education in early America.
143. See M. BACON, 2 NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAw 1-32 (1811); 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
67.
144. He certainly owned a copy of Bacon's New Abridgement of the Law. See Swindler,
supra note 142, at 208 n.4.
145. See Journalof the Meetings, supra note 46.
146. See FORD, supra note 48.
147. 7 Va. (4 Call) at 8.
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At root this was a struggle to shape an inherited institution into a
form able to serve peculiarly American interests without destroying
the institution's capacity to transmit values important to the survival of the western heritage";' "[tihere emerged during the colonial period that pattern of outside control which would permanently
characterize American colleges. In the early government . . . of
William and Mary there were some signs of the growth of a system
of dual control under which the faculty would rule subject to veto
by an outside body. But. . .such a system [did not] last. . . .By
the mid-18th century, when William and Mary College was flourishing, the gentry had clearly prevailed over the academics. . ..
American colleges would not be self-governing guilds of the
learned."' 4 9
148. Thomson, supra note 7, at 187-88.
149. D. BOORSTN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 177-78 (1958).

